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Abstract
This paper presents an embodied
biologically-plausible model investigating the
relationships existing between classical and
instrumental conditioning. The architecture
and functioning of the model is constrained
with some some important anatomical and
physiological assumptions drawn from the
relevant neuroscientific literature. The model
is validated by successfully reproducing the
primary outcomes of some instrumental-
conditioning devaluation tests conducted
with normal and amygdala-lesioned rats.
These experiments are particularly important
as they show how the sensitivity to internal
states (as satiety) exhibited by classical
conditioning mechanisms can transfer to
behaviors acquired on the basis of instru-
mental conditioning mechanisms. The results
presented are relevant for both neuroscience
and behavioural sciences as they are based on
a model, constrained and validated at both
neural and behavioural level, which indicates
how internal states might modulate learning
and performance of rigid habits so as to
render to action some of the flexibility typical
of goal-directed behaviour. The results are
also relevant for autonomous robotics as
they start to investigate, with an embodied
system, how the use of sophisticated moti-
vational systems might allow building robots
capable of exhibiting some of the flexibility
typical of organisms.
1 Introduction
The flexibility and capacity of adaptation of organ-
isms greatly depends on their learning capabilities.
For this reason, animal psychology has devoted great
efforts to the study of learning processes. In partic-
ular, in the last century a huge body of empirical
data have been collected around the two main experi-
mental paradigms of ‘classical conditioning’ (Pavlov,
1927; Lieberman, 1993) and ‘instrumental condition-
ing’ (Thorndike, 1911; Skinner, 1938; Domjan, 2006).
Classical conditioning (also called ‘Pavlovian con-
ditioning’) refers to an experimental paradigm in
which a certain basic behaviour such as salivation
or approaching (the ‘unconditioned response’ – UR),
which is linked to a biologically salient stimulus such
as food ingestion (the ‘unconditioned stimulus’ –
US), gets associated to a neutral stimulus like the
sound of a bell (the ‘conditioned stimulus’ – CS), af-
ter the neutral stimulus is repeatedly presented be-
fore the appearance of the salient stimulus. Such ac-
quired associations are briefly referred to as ‘CS-US’
or ‘CS-UR’ associations (Pavlov, 1927; Lieberman,
1993).
Instrumental conditioning (also called ‘operant
conditioning’) refers to an experimental paradigm in
which an animal, given a certain stimulus/contexts
such as a lever in a cage (the ‘stimulus’ – S), learns
to produce a particular action such as pressing the
lever (the ‘response’ – R), which produces a certain
outcome such as the opening of the cage (the ‘action
outcome’ – O), if this outcome is consistently accom-
panied by a reward such as the access to food. In this
case, the acquired associations are briefly referred to
as either ‘S-R’ associations, when the reactive nature
of the acquired behaviour is stressed, or ‘A-O’ asso-
ciations, when the goal-directed nature of behaviour
is stressed (Thorndike, 1911; Skinner, 1938; Domjan,
2006, see below).
This empirical work has been paralleled by the de-
velopment, within the machine learning literature,
of ‘reinforcement learning algorithms’ (Sutton and
Barto, 1981, 1998), that is algorithms directed to
provide machines with the capacity of learning new
behaviors on the basis of rewarding stimuli (i.e. sig-
nals from the external environment that inform the
machine about the achievement of desired goals). In-
terestingly, reinforcement learning algorithms have
gained increasing interest within the empirical lit-
erature on animal learning as they represent theo-
retical models that can potentially furnish coherent
explanations of organisms’ learning processes. In-
deed, a class of such models, the so-called temporal-
difference learning algorithms (TD-learning), are
currently considered as the best available theoreti-
cal accounts of several key empirical findings (Dayan
and Balleine, 2002; Schultz, 2002; Houk et al., 1995).
Notwithstanding their success, standard reinforce-
ment learning models suffer of several limitations
from a biological point of view. In particular, three of
the main drawbacks are as follows. First, such mod-
els ignore the role of internal states (e.g. hunger vs.
satiety related to a certain type of food) in modulat-
ing the effects of ‘external’ rewards (e.g. the receival
of such a food). Such kind of effects are exhibited by
organisms, for example, in ‘devaluation’ experiments
in which animals tend to change their reinforced be-
haviors in case the value of a rewarding stimulus,
such as a food, is suddenly decreased through satia-
tion or its association with poison. By ignoring the
role of internal states in learning and behavior, cur-
rent reinforcement learning models can not account
for such effects.
Second, standard models do not take into account
the important difference existing, within instrumen-
tally acquired behaviors, between ‘habits’ and ‘goal-
direct actions’, that is between those instrumen-
tally acquired behaviors that are automatically trig-
gered by antecedent stimuli and those that are con-
trolled by their consequences (Yin and Knowlton,
2006). In fact, while classical (behaviorist) reinforce-
ment learning theory assumed that all behaviors are
elicited by some antecedent stimulus from the exter-
nal environment, over the last few decades a signifi-
cant body of research has demonstrated that animals
are able to control their own behavior on the bases
of the expected outcomes of their actions. The most
important way to assess whether a behavior is driven
by a stimulus or by an expected outcome is through
a devaluation experiment: if a stimulus (S) elicits a
response (R) only in case the associated reinforcing
outcome (O) has not been devaluated, then it is evi-
dent that the behavior is driven by the outcome and
not by the stimulus. Indeed, sensitiveness to the ma-
nipulation of outcome value has been proposed (cf.
Yin and Knowlton, 2006) as part of the operational
definition of goal-directed behaviors driven by action-
outcome (A-O) associations as distinct from habits
driven by stimulus-response (S-R) associations.
Third, standard models tend to conflate the no-
tions of classical conditioning and instrumental con-
ditioning. On the contrary, accumulating empiri-
cal evidence indicates that classical and instrumen-
tal conditioning are based on different processes
that rely on distinct neural systems. Furthermore,
such processes interplay in complex ways (Dayan
and Balleine, 2002), as demonstrated, for example,
by phenomena like ‘PIT – Pavlovian-Instrumental
Transfer’ (where a conditioned stimulus that is pre-
dictive of reward can energize the execution of instru-
mentally acquired behaviours), and ‘incentive learn-
ing’ (where, under certain conditions, the valence of
an action outcome needs to be re-learned to exert its
effects on behaviour).
This paper starts to address these limitations by
presenting a novel computational model which (a)
is strongly rooted in the anatomy and physiology of
the mammal brain, (b) is embodied in a simulated
robotic rat, and (c) reproduces the results of em-
pirical devaluation experiments conducted on both
normal and amygdala-lesioned 1 rats (Balleine et al.,
2003). Since, as indicated above, devaluation phe-
nomena constitute the most evident demonstrations
of both the role of internal states in modulating be-
havior and the distinction between habits and goal-
driven behaviors, and since, as indicated below, here
it is assumed that devaluation phenomena depend on
the modulation of instrumental processes by Pavlo-
vian processes, the attempt to reproduce these exper-
iments constitutes the most appropriate way of ad-
dressing the aforementioned drawbacks of standard
reinforcement learning models.
For these reasons, the proposed model constitutes
the first working computational model that imple-
ments a coherent picture about the neural mech-
anisms underlying conditioning phenomena. More
1The amygdala, an almond-shaped group of nuclei located
within each medial temporal lobe of the brain, is associated
with a wide range of cognitive functions, including emotional
regulation, learning, action selection, memory, attention and
perception. Amygdala is involved in both aversive behaviours
such as those involved in fear conditioning and taste aversion
experiments (Blair et al., 2005; Knight et al., 2005; Maren,
2005), and appetitive behaviours (Baxter and Murray, 2002a;
Cardinal et al., 2002; Balleine and Killcross, 2006). The func-
tioning of amygdala relies on both its capacity to assign emo-
tional valence to stimuli on the basis of input information
related to internal body states, and on its capacity to asso-
ciate neutral stimuli, biologically salient stimuli and innate re-
sponses. Some of its main functional sub-systems are (McDon-
ald, 1998; Pitka¨nen et al., 2000) the ‘central nucleus’ (CeA),
responsible for triggering innate responses and neuromodula-
tion processes underlying learning and broad brain regulation,
and the ‘basolateral complex’ (BLA), responsible for forming
CS-US associations (Mannella et al., 2008).
specifically, the model is built upon the following
three fundamental assumptions:
1. The amygdala constitutes the CS-US associator
at the core of Pavlovian conditioning phenomena.
2. The cortex-dorsolateral striatum 2 pathway,
forming S-R associations, constitutes the main
actor involved in instrumental conditioning.
3. The amygdala-nucleus accumbens pathway
‘bridges’ classical conditioning processes happen-
ing in the amygdala and instrumental processes
taking place in the basal ganglia, and so it allows
producing the behaviours exhibited by rats in
devaluation experiments.
Although the main goals of this papers have a sci-
entific relevance, the research agenda that covers the
work presented here is believed to posses the poten-
tial to produce useful outcomes also for technology.
In fact, undoubtedly living organisms’ behavior is
characterized by a degree of autonomy and a flexi-
bility that greatly overcomes those of current robots.
A way to tackle these limits is to attempt to un-
derstand the mechanisms underlying organisms’ be-
havioural flexibility as done here so as to use them
in designing robot’s controllers.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows.
Sect. 2 illustrates the general methodological ap-
proach which guided the research reported in this
paper. Sect. 3 reports the original experiments ad-
dressed by the model. Sect. 4 describes the simulated
rats and environment used to tests the model. Sect. 5
contains a detailed description of the model. Sect. 6
reports the main results. Finally, Sect. 7 concludes
the paper.
2 The Method Used: Computational
Embodied Neuroscience
This paper addresses issues related to animal learn-
ing (in particular, conditioning phenomena) by fol-
lowing an approach which can be referred to as
‘CEN – Computational Embodied Neuroscience’ (cf.
Prescott et al., 2003, 2006 which propose a research
method which shares some principles with the ap-
proach proposed here). This method aims at provid-
ing general and sufficiently strong criteria for select-
2The striatum is the input portion of the basal ganglia, a
set of forebrain subcortical nuclei that are traditionally consid-
ered to be responsible for instrumental conditioning phenom-
ena (i.e. the locus of S-R associations: Packard and Knowlton,
2002; Yin and Knowlton, 2006). In rats, the striatum can
be divided in: (a) dorsolateral striatum, mainly underlying
motor-execution functions; (b) dorsomedial striatum, playing
a role in motor-preparation and cognitive functions; (c) nu-
cleus accumbens (or ventral striatum), considered an impor-
tant interface (Mogenson et al., 1980) between the motiva-
tional processes taking place in the limbic system and the mo-
tor processes taking place within the rest of the basal ganglia
and cortex)
ing models so as to produce theoretical cumulativity
in the study of brain and behaviour. Indeed, the
great amount of empirical data provided by neuro-
science, psychology and the other related disciplines
are seldom integrated by strong and general theoret-
ical explanations, thus failing to produce a coherent
picture of the phenomena under investigation. CEN
aims to overcome these limits by relying upon the
following principles:
1. Evolutionary and adaptive framework. The the-
ory of evolution (Darwin, 1859) is the fundamen-
tal theoretical framework needed to understand
biological phenomena and hence also to under-
stand brain and behavior. This has at least
three important implications. First, it tends to
lead the focus of investigation on the function for
the organisms’ survival and reproduction of brain
mechanisms and behavioural processes more than
on their mere mechanical functioning. This is in
contrast with some neuroscientific research which
pose their attention only on neural mechanisms
per-se, without trying to understand their role in
organisms’ adaptation. Second, it leads to recog-
nise that much of the brain and behaviour func-
tioning is related to the organisms’ need to adapt
their behaviour to varying environmental condi-
tions during life and to avoid wholly encoding
behaviour in the DNA. Third, it leads to recog-
nize that the brain’s architecture, physiology and
plasticity mechanisms are the outcome of a ‘blind’
evolutionary process based on complex ‘reproduc-
tion with variation’ mechanisms. The first point
leads to formulate scientific questions with an em-
phasis on function. The last two points lead to
investigate (and to explicitly model, see below)
the learning and evolutionary processes that ‘his-
torically’ lead organisms’ brain and behaviour to
be as they are (Parisi et al., 1990; Zlatev and
Balkenius, 2001; Weng et al., 2001).
2. Complex systems framework. The brain and the
brain-body-environment set are complex systems.
Complex systems are systems formed by many
parts (e.g. brain neurons) which interact via lo-
cal rules (e.g. activation potentials). These in-
teractions lead to the emergence of the global
behaviour of the system without (fully) relying
upon centralised coordination mechanisms, but
on self-organisation principles such as positive
feedback and negative feedback (Camazine et al.,
2001; Baldassarre, 2008). This not only implies
that brain and behaviour have to be studied with
computational models (see below) but also that
their understanding has to rely upon the concepts
of complex-system theory.
3. Computational models. The investigation of
brain and behaviour conducted on the basis of
empirical experiments and observations (such as
those of neuroscience, psychology and ethology)
should be accompanied by the instantiation of
theories into formal computational models, that
is computer programs that simulate the mech-
anisms underlying brain processes and produce
behaviour as an emergent outcome of their func-
tioning. The rationale behind this principle is
that the brain, and the brain-body-environment
set, are complex systems, and theories expressed
only through words or analytically-solved equa-
tion systems can give only limited, not very gen-
erative accounts of these phenomena.
4. Constraints from behaviour. The computational
models used to instantiate the theories have to
be capable of reproducing the investigated be-
haviour, in line with what is proposed by ‘arti-
ficial ethology’ (Holland and McFarland, 2001).
Furthermore, the comparison between the model
and the target behaviour should be done on a de-
tailed basis (i.e., with reference to the outcomes
of specific target experiments) and possibly in
quantitative terms (i.e., not just with vague, qual-
itative comparisons).
5. Constraints from brain. Challenging models with
the request to account for specific behavioural
data, is not enough as, given a behaviour, many
alternative models capable of reproducing it can
always be built. For this reason, a second fun-
damental source of constraints for models are the
data on the anatomy and physiology of the brain.
These data should be used in two ways. First,
for choosing the assumptions that drive the de-
sign of the architecture, functioning, and learning
mechanisms of the models. Second, for testing
the low-level predictions produced by the mod-
els (i.e. the predictions produced at the neural
level). This principle comes from computational
neuroscience (Sejnowski et al., 1988) urging com-
putational models to keenly account for data on
brain.
6. Embodiment. In line with the ideas proposed
by the ‘animats approach’ (Meyer and Wilson,
1991) and ‘artificial life’ (Langton, 1987), models
should be capable of reproducing the addressed
behaviours within ‘whole’ autonomous systems
acting on the basis of circular interactions with
the environment mediated by the body (the sen-
sors, the actuators and the internal body states).
Indeed, the brain generates behaviour by form-
ing a large dynamical complex system together
with the body and the environment (Clark, 1997;
Nolfi and Floreano, 2000; Nolfi, 2006), so a full
understanding of brain and behaviour needs to
rely on models that take into consideration this
fundamental fact.
The principle has two implications. First, the
computational models should involve the simula-
tion of both organisms’ brains and their body and
environment, thus letting behaviors emerge from
the interactions between those systems. Second,
models should aim at being scalable to realistic
setups, that is they should be capable of func-
tioning with realistic sensors (e.g. retinas), real-
istic actuators (e.g. bodies should be governed
by realistic Newtonian dynamics), realistic sce-
narios (e.g. objects and supports with complex
textures, shapes, and dynamics), and noise (af-
fecting sensors, actuators, environment, etc.).
7. Generality. Computational models should aim to
reproduce and account for an increasing amount
of data from an increasing number of differ-
ent experiments. This principle is important
as it is a strong drive towards the produc-
tion of comprehensive accounts and general the-
ories of brain and behaviour, against the ten-
dency to generate many unrelated and mutu-
ally incompatible theories each accounting for
only a limited set of empirical data. This prin-
ciple is in line with the ‘spirit’ of both ‘sys-
tems computational neuroscience’ (Brody et al.,
2004), that aims at explaining the functioning of
whole brain systems rather than specific areas or
physiological/chemical mechanisms, and with the
computationally-informed approaches proposed
within psychology (Newell, 1973), which stress
the need of identifying general principles and the-
ories on behaviour.
3 Target Experiment
The target data addressed with the model are re-
ported in Balleine et al. (2003) which illustrates var-
ious experiments directed to investigate the relations
existing between the manipulation of the value of pri-
mary rewards (devaluation) and instrumental condi-
tioning, and the role that Amygdala (Amg) plays in
them. The present work focusses on ‘Experiment 1’
reported in the article, a standard ‘devaluation test’.
This experiment is particularly well-suited to test
four important processes that the model aims to cap-
ture: (a) the association between neutral stimuli (e.g.
the sight of a lever) and biologically salient stimuli
(e.g. food); (b) the dependence of the evaluation of
external stimuli (e.g. food, levers, etc.) on internal
states; (c) learning and use of ‘habits’, that is stereo-
typed and rigid behaviours acquired during pro-
longed periods of trial-and-error learning (these pro-
cesses are well-captured by standard reinforcement-
learning models); (d) the influence of internal states,
mediated by the associations between neutral-stimuli
and biologically-salient-stimuli, on the selection and
triggering of habits.
In two preliminary phases of the experiment,
eight sham-lesioned plus eight rats whose basolateral
amygdala complex (BLA) was lesioned were trained
in separate trials to press a lever or pull a chain to ob-
tain two different kinds of food, respectively Noyes
pellets and maltodextrin. The training phase was
followed by an extinction test lasting 20 mins (di-
vided in groups of 2 mins) where: (a) both manipu-
landa were present in the experimental chamber; (b)
half of the rats had been previously satiated with
Noyes pellets while the other half with maltodex-
trin. The main result indicated that during the first
two minutes of the test non-lesioned rats performed
the action corresponding to the manipulandum of
the non-satiated food with a much higher rate with
respect to the other manipulandum. On the other
hand, BLA-lesioned rats did not show any devalu-
ation effect: they performed the two actions at the
same rate. These experiments clearly demonstrate
that BLA plays a fundamental role in the transfer of
the diminished hedonic value of food to instrumen-
tally acquired habits. As we shall see in Sect. 5, this
key finding is central for clarifying the relationship
existing between Pavlovian and instrumental condi-
tioning.
4 The Simulated Organism, Environ-
ment and Experiments
In line with the CEN approach (Sect. 2), the model
presented here was tested within an embodied sys-
tem. Although we are aware that the role of the ‘de-
gree of embodiment and situatedness’ of the model
and simulations presented here is rather limited (e.g.
the sensors and actuators used are rather simplified,
low-level behaviors are hardwired, etc.), nevertheless
the use of a simulated organism and experimental
setup forced us to design a model potentially capable
to cope with the difficulties posed by more realistic
setups. For example, the noise of behaviour execu-
tion, and the randomly variable duration of the tri-
als, actions’ execution, and rewarding effects posed
interesting challenges to the robustness of the learn-
ing algorithms of the model.
The model was tested with a simulated robotic rat
(‘ICEAsim’) developed within the EU project ICEA
on the basis of the physics 3D simulator WebotsTM.
The model was written in MatlabTM and was inter-
faced with ICEAsim through a TCP/IP connection.
The robotic setup used to test the model is shown
in Fig. 1 and it is now briefly described skipping de-
tails not central for the paper’s goals. The training
and test environment is composed by a grey walled
chamber containing a yellow lever, a red chain, and
a grey food-dispenser that turns green or blue when
respectively food A or food B is delivered in it. When
‘pressed’ or ‘pulled’, the lever and chain make respec-
tively food A or B (the rewarding stimuli) available
at the dispenser.
The simulated rat is a wheel-chair robot equipped
with various sensors. Among these, the experi-
ments reported here use two cameras (furnishing a
panoramic 300 degrees view) and the whisker sen-
sors. The rat uses the cameras to detect the lever,
the chain and the food dispenser, in particular their
presence/absence (via their color) and their (egocen-
tric) direction. The rat uses the whiskers, activated
with one if bent beyond a certain threshold and zero
otherwise, to detect contacts with obstacles. The rat
is also endowed with internal sensors related to sati-
ety for either food A or B (these sensors assume the
value of one when the rat is satiated, and zero oth-
erwise). The rat’s actuators are two motors that can
independently control the speed of the two wheels.
For simplicity, the information fed to the model is
only related to the presence/absence of the lever and
chain in the test chamber and food A and food B in
mouth, whereas the other information is used to con-
trol a four low-level hardwired behavioral routines.
These routines, triggered either by the model or di-
rectly by stimuli, are as follows: (1) obstacle avoid-
ance routine: this routine, triggered by the whiskers,
‘overwrites’ all other actions to avoid obstacles; (2,
3) lever press routine and chain pull routine: these
routines, activated by the model, cause the rat to ap-
proach the lever/chain on the basis of their visually
detected direction; when the lever/chain are touched
they activate the food delivery in the dispenser; (4)
consummatory routine: when the dispenser turns
green or blue (this signals the presence of food in it),
the rat approaches and touches it (‘consummation’
of the food) so causing the perception of respectively
food A or food B in mouth; the routine ends after
the rat touches the dispenser ten times.
The simulated devaluation experiment is divided
in a training phase and two test phases. The train-
ing phase lasts 8 mins and the two test phases 2
mins each. Each phase is divided in trials that end
either when the rat executes the correct action and
consumes the food or after a 15s timeout (the dura-
tion of the experimental phases is shorter than the
duration of the original experiment’s phases as the
limited complexity and number of available actions
of the simulated rat allowed a faster learning). In
each trial the rat is set in the middle of the chamber
with an orientation randomly set between the lever
and the chain direction. In the trials of the training-
phase either the lever and food A or the chain and
food B are used in an alternate fashion and the rat
is always ‘hungry’ (the two satiation sensors are set
to 0). In the two test phases, the rat is respectively
satiated either with food A (the satiation sensors for
food A and B are respectively set to one and zero)
or with food B. In all trials of the two test phases
Figure 1: Left: A snapshot of the simulator, showing the simulated rat at the center of the experimental chamber,
the food dispenser (behind the rat), the lever (at the rat’s left hand side) and the chain (at the rat’s right hand side).
Right: The architecture of the model.
both manipulanda are present and the rat is eval-
uated in extinction (i.e. without delivery of food).
The experiment (the three phases) was run 20 times
with ‘unlesioned’ artificial rats and 20 times with ‘le-
sioned’ rats.
5 The Model
The model (Fig. 1) is formed by three major com-
ponents: (a) the amygdala which instantiates an
CS-US associator and is at the core of Pavlovian
conditioning (Baxter and Murray, 2002b; Cardinal
et al., 2002); (b) the cortex-dorsolateral striatum
pathway which learns, via instrumental condition-
ing processes, habits based on S-R associations (Yin
and Knowlton, 2006); (c) the amygdala-nucleus ac-
cumbens pathway which ‘bridges’ classical condition-
ing processes happening in the amygdala and instru-
mental processes taking place in the basal ganglia
(Baxter and Murray, 2002b; Cardinal et al., 2002).
The model’s input is formed by six neurons acti-
vated by the sensors illustrated in Sect. 4: two neu-
rons encode the presence/absence of the lever and
the chain (slev and scha), two neurons encode the
presence/absence of food A food B in the rat’s mouth
(sfA and sfB), and two neurons encode the satiation
for food A and food B (ssfA and ssfB).
5.1 The Amygdala: A CS-US Associator
The associator implements Pavlovian conditioning
through the association between CSs and USs (‘stim-
ulus substitution’). In real brains this role seems to
be played by the Amg (Baxter and Murray, 2002b;
Cardinal et al., 2002). There are massive recipro-
cal connections between the Amg and several brain
areas, including: inferotemporal cortex (IT), insu-
lar cortex (IC), prefrontal cortex (PFC), and hip-
pocampus (Hip) (Price, 2003; Rolls, 2005; Baxter
and Murray, 2002b; Cardinal et al., 2002). Further-
more, Amg receives inputs from posterior intralami-
nar nucleui of thalamus (PIL) (Shi and Davis, 1999).
These connections underlie an interplay between pro-
cesses related to perceived (or represented) external
context (IT, PFC, Hip) and processes related to in-
ternal states (IC, PIL). In general, Amg can be seen
as playing the function of assigning a subjective va-
lence to external events on the basis of the animal’s
internal context (needs, motivations, etc.), and to use
this to both regulate learning processes and directly
influence behavior.
The model’s associator, which is considered as
an abstraction of the processes taking place in the
Amg, performs ‘asynchronous learning/syncronous
functioning’ associations. First, stimuli perceived
in different times are associated (CSs are associ-
ated to USs): this associative learning takes place
if USs cause a dopamine (DA) release (see below).
When the association is established, CSs are able
to synchronously re-activate the USs’ representa-
tions in Amg. The associator is composed by a
vector amg = (amglev, amgcha, amgfA, amgfB)′ of
four reciprocally-connected leaky neurons that pro-
cess the input signals as follows:
τamg · ˙amgp = −amgp+ (1)
(slev, scha, (sfA − ssfA), (sfB − ssfB))′+
Wamg · amg
amg = ϕ[tanh[amgp]]
where amgp are the activation potentials of Amg,
ϕ[.] is a positive linear function (ϕ[x] = 0 if x ≤ 0
and ϕ[x] = x otherwise) and Wamg is the matrix
of all-to-all lateral connection weights within Amg.
Note that while external stimuli have a binary repre-
sentation (0/1 for absence/presence), internal stimuli
modulate the representation of external stimuli. In
particular ssfB and ssfB assume a value in {0, 5}
when the corresponding satiation has respectively a
low or high value, and this simulates the fact that
satiation for a food inhibits the hedonic represen-
tation of such food within Amg. This assumption is
supported by evidence indicating that a similar com-
putation is performed in the secondary taste areas of
the prefrontal/insular cortex (Rolls, 2005) connected
with Amg. This part of the model is particularly im-
portant because, as we shall see, it mediates the in-
fluence of the shifts of primary motivations on both
learning and behavior.
The associator’s learning is based on the onset
of input signals, detected as follows. First, ‘leaky
traces’ tr of the derivatives of amg, trunked to pos-
itive values, are computed:
τtr · t˙r = −tr+ CAmg · ϕ[ ˙amg] (2)
where CAmg is an amplification coefficient. Second,
the derivatives of tr are computed: when positive,
these derivatives detect the onset of the original sig-
nals, whereas when negative they detect the fact that
some time elapsed since such onset took place.
The weights between Amg’s neurons are updated
on the basis of the signs of t˙r and the DA signal
(see below). In particular, when (and only when)
the derivative of the presynaptic neuron’s trace is
negative and the derivative of the postsynaptic neu-
ron’s trace is positive (notice that this happens when
the presynaptic neuron fires before the postsynaptic
neuron) the related connection is strengthened (for
all couples of neurons this condition is encoded in
the matrix L with Boolean elements):
∆Wamg = ηamg · ϕ[da− thda] · L (3)
where ηamg is a learning rate coefficient, da is the
dopamine signal and thda is a threshold over which
dopamine elicits learning.
DA release (corresponding to activation in the ven-
tral tegmental area, VTA, and in the substantia nigra
pars compacta, SNpc) is triggered by Amg through
the units representing the hedonic impact of food
and by the primary reward signals received from
the peduncolo pontine tegmental nucleus (PPT)
(Kobayashi and Okada, 2007):
τdap · ˙dap = −dap + dabaseline+ (4)
wamg−da · (amgfA + amgfB )+
wppt−da · ppt
da = ϕ[tanh[dap]]
where ppt = sfA+ sfB is the PPT’s primary reward
signal. DA drives learning in both the associator and
the action selectors (see Sect. 5.2 and 5.3).
5.2 The Cortex-Dorsolateral Striatum
Pathway: A S-R Associator
The action selector based on the cortex-dorsolateral
striatum learns ‘habits’ (S-R associations) through
reinforcement learning processes. In real brains
this function might be implemented in the cortex-
dorsolateral striatum pathway (Yin and Knowlton,
2006). In the model this component receives slev and
scha as input and, on the basis of this, selects one of
the two lever-press/chain-pull actions (together with
NAc, see Sect. 5.3).
The component is formed by four layers of neu-
rons corresponding to four vectors: (a) a visual sen-
sory cortex (SC) leaky-neuron layer: sc; (b) a neuron
layer corresponding to DLS’s encoding of the ‘votes’
for the two actions: dls; (c) a neuron layer corre-
sponding to premotor cortex (PM), formed by re-
ciprocally inhibiting neurons that implement a com-
petition for selecting one of the two actions (this
function might be implemented by the reciprocal
thalamo-cortical connections, Dayan and Balleine,
2002): pm; (d) a layer corresponding to motor cortex
(M), representing the selected action with a binary
code: m.
The visual leaky-neuron layer processes the input
signal in a straightforward fashion:
τsc · s˙cp = −scp + (slev, scha)′ (5)
sc = ϕ[tanh[scp]]
SC is fully connected with DLS. DLS’s (non-leaky)
neurons collect the signals from SC that tend to rep-
resent the evidence (‘votes’) in favor of the selection
of either one of the two actions:
dlsp =W(sc−dls) · sc (6)
dls = ϕ[tanh[dlsp + dlsbaseline]]
The selection of actions is performed on the ba-
sis of these votes (and NAc’s votes, see Sect. 5.3)
through a competition taking place between the
leaky neurons of DLS:
τpm · ˙pmp = −pmp + wdls−nac−pm· (7)
(dls+ nac) +Wpm · pm+ n
pm = ϕ[tanh[pmp]]
where wdls−nac−pm is a coefficient scaling the votes,
Wpm are the PM’s lateral connection weights, and n
is a noise vector with components uniformly drawn in
[−n, n]. The assumption for which the action selec-
tion takes place within PM, used here for simplicity,
raises interesting complex problems which are dis-
cussed in Sect. 7.
When one of the pm neurons reaches an activation
threshold thA, the execution of the corresponding
action is triggered via M :
m = ψ[pm− thA] (8)
where ψ[x] is a step function (ψ[x] = 0 if x ≤ 0
and ψ[x] = 1 otherwise). Once the execution of the
routine corresponding to the selected action termi-
nates, the connection weights between SC and DLS,
Wsc−dls, are modified according to the dopamine
signal (this might be null in the case the wrong action
has been selected):
∆Wsc−dls = ηsc−dls · ϕ[da− thda] ·m · sc′ (9)
where ηsc−dls is a learning coefficient. Note that here
M activations were directly used to train both the
DLS and NAc (see Sect. 7 on this strong assump-
tion).
5.3 The Amygdala-Nucleus Accumbens
Pathway: A Bridge between Pavlovian
and Instrumental Processes
The Amg-NAc pathway ‘bridges’ Pavlovian pro-
cesses to instrumental processes in that it learns A-O
associations between the USs encoded in Amg (which
might be thought of as desired outcomes of actions,
corresponding to ingested elements of food in the
presence of hunger for such food, elicited by the CSs,
e.g. the sight of a lever) and actions encoded in the
SC-DLS-PM pathway. In real brains this function
might be implemented by the neural pathway con-
necting the BLA nuclei of Amg to NAc (Baxter and
Murray, 2002b). In the model the pathway is im-
plemented through an all-to-all connection matrix
Wamg−nac linking the Amg’s hedonic representation
of food, amgfA and amgfB , to the NAc’s (non-leaky)
neurons:
nacp =Wamg−nac · (mgfA, amgfB)′ (10)
nac = ϕ[tanh[nacp + nacbaseline]]
NAc’s neurons play the same function as DLS
neurons, namely they represents ‘votes’ that bias
the action competition taking place in PM. Simi-
larly to SC-DLS connections, Amg-NAc connections
Wamg−nac are modified, after action execution, on
the basis of the dopamine signal:
∆Wamg−nac = ηamg−nac · ϕ[da− thda]· (11)
m · (amgfA, amgfB)
where η(amg−nac) is the learning rate coefficient.
Note that in the experiments reported in Sect. 6 the
lesions of rats’ BLA have been simulated by setting
the Amg-NAc connections Wamg−nac to zero.
The importance of the Amg-NAc action selector
resides in the fact that its ‘votes’ for the various ac-
tions can be modulated on the fly by the system’s
motivational states, e.g. by satiety for either one of
the two foods. In general, this mechanisms opens’ up
the possibility for the motivational-sensitive Pavlo-
vian system (mainly the Amg in the model) to ex-
ert a direct effect on actions without the need of re-
learning processes, as it will be exemplified by the
devaluation experiments illustrated in the next sec-
tion.
5.4 Parameters’ Setting and Justification
The model’s parameters were set as follows. The
model’s equations were integrated with a ∆t = 50ms
time step: this rather long value allows running fast
simulations and at the same time avoiding stability
problems. The decay coefficient of most leaky neu-
rons of the model were set to a rather high value
(which implies a slow dynamics) as such neurons
are intended to abstract the activation of popula-
tions of real neurons: τsc = 500ms, τamg = 500ms,
τpm = 500ms. The decay of DA is set to a rather low
value (which implies a fast dynamics) to reproduce
the fast dynamics of phasic dopamine bursts underly-
ing learning (Schultz, 2002): τda = 50ms. The decay
of learning traces is set to a high value in order to
allow the association between stimuli having onsets
separated by time intervals ranging within few sec-
onds, as it happens in real rats: τtr = 1000ms. The
trace-derivative amplification coefficient is set to a
high value to suitably amplify the low value of the
derivative of Amg neurons’ activation: Camg = 50.
The NAc and DLS baseline coefficients, and the
weights connecting them to PM, are set to suitable
values so as to not overcome the action triggering
threshold in PM: nacbaseline = .3, dlsbaseline = .3,
wdls−nac−pm = .5, thA = .6. The baseline of DA is
set below the DA threshold which trigger learning:
thDA = .6, dabaseline = .3. The Amg-DA connec-
tions are set to a value lower than the PPN-DA to
have a DA signal stronger for primary rewards (US)
than for secondary rewards (CS): wamg−da = .3,
wppn−da = .6. On the other side, the noise level
is set to a rather high value to allow triggering of ac-
tions in the initial exploratory phase where the signal
activation of NAc and DLS is null or low: n = .6.
Learning coefficients are set to relatively low values
to have a progressive stable learning: ηamg = .015,
ηamg−nac = .02, ηsc−dls = .02. The weights of lat-
eral connections between PM neurons are set to val-








This section describes the basic functioning of the
model on the basis of Fig. 2. The figure shows the
activations of various neurons related to the lever
(data related to the chain are omitted as qualitatively
similar) during both the training and testing phases
of an experiment run with a non-lesioned simulated
rat. It also shows the activations of the same neurons
in the two test phases of a lesioned rat.
At the beginning of the training phase, the base-
line activations of DLS and NAc (dlslev, naclev), to-
gether with noise, are sufficient to occasionally trig-
ger the execution of an action (mlev) by the compe-
tition taking place in PM (pmlev). When the behav-
ioral routine corresponding to the selected action is
appropriate for the environment configuration (e.g.
‘lever press’ in the presence of lever), the dispenser
becomes green and the rat approaches it and con-
sumes the corresponding food (sfA). The food con-
sumption activates the internal hedonic representa-
tion of food in Amg (amgfA) and hence the neurons
in VTA/SNpc release DA in DLS. This drives the
learning of the cortex-dorsolateral striatum instru-
mental pathway. The effect of these events is that
after a few learning trials the model learns the S-R
habits which perform the action which is appropriate
to the current context: ‘sight of lever-press lever’ and
‘sight of chain-pull chain’. The progress of habits’
learning can be seen in terms of: (a) the increase
of DLS’s votes for the press lever action (dlslev) in
the trials in which the lever is present (slev); (b) the
increase of the regularity of the peaks of the food
A amygdala neurons (amgfA); (c) the DA release in
VTA/SNpc (da).
When instrumental S-R associations begin to
form, the vision of the neutral stimuli of the lever
(slev, amglev) starts to be reliably followed, within a
relatively small time interval, by the food perception
in mouth (sfA). The food perception, as mentioned
above, causes a DA release (da). This contingency
and the DA signal allow the Pavlovian learning tak-
ing place within Amg to ‘take off’ and form CS-US
associations between the lever and Amg’s food A
representation. This is evident from the fact that
after a few successful trials the Amg’s food-A neu-
ron (amgfA) not only shows an activation peak when
food A is delivered but it is also pre-activated by the
presence of the lever: this reveals that a Pavlovian
association is being acquired between the CS (lever)
and the US (food). Note how these processes show a
rather interesting interaction between Pavlovian and
instrumental processes. In the model, as in organ-
isms (Lieberman, 1993), Pavlovian CS-US associa-
tions can form only if the two stimuli are separated
by a time lag lasting at maximum few seconds (in the
model, this is due to the dynamics of Amg’s traces,
see Eq. 2 and Sect. 5.4). As with the progress of the
S-R instrumental learning, e.g. involving the ‘sight
of lever-press lever’ association, the sight of the lever
(CS) is followed progressively more readily and reg-
ularly by the food (US), this allows Pavlovian pro-
cesses to form the association CS-US, which would
not otherwise form (roughly speaking, it might be
said that ‘Pavlov’ observes and registers a contin-
gency suddenly appearing in the environment due to
‘Skinner’).
The pre-activation of the amgfA neuron due to
the perception of the conditioned stimulus is respon-
sible for the early DA release (da) which anticipates
the future delivery of reward. Even if this process
does not play any particular function in the current
model, it reproduces an important well-known phe-
nomenon observed in real animals (Schultz, 2002),
and shows how Amg can play an important role in
the neuromodulation of brain, in this case the DA
release.



















Figure 3: Averages and standard deviations of the num-
ber of actions selected (y-axis) by Sham and BLA-
lesioned rats during different tests involving devaluation
of either Food A or Food B.
A last important learning process takes place in
the Amg-NAc pathway. This process is at the basis
of the influence of Amg on the selection of habits tak-
ing place in the SC-DLS pathway. Once the CS-US
associations are formed in the Amg, CSs, such as the
lever, can trigger the activation of the Amg’s hedo-
nic representation of the related food and, via this,
influence DLS action selection via NAc. This process
is shown by the fact that, after some training, NAc
starts to activate and to vote for the correct actions
(naclev). The importance of the formation of this
Stimuli-Amg-NAc-PM pathway resides in the fact
that it constitutes the fundamental bridge between
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Figure 2: Activations of some key neurons of a non-lesioned rat during the a training phase (first block); activations of
the same neurons in two test phases where the same rat was satiated either with food A or B (second and third block);
activations of the same neurons of a BLA-lesioned rat in two similar test phases (fourth and fifth block). Trials are
separated by short vertical lines.
and the instrumental processes happening in the SC-
DLS pathway. We claim that this pathway plays a
central role in the flexibility demonstrated by real
organisms. In particular, it is through this pathway
that instant motivational manipulations that char-
acterize Pavlovian conditioning are able to directly
affect instrumentally learned behaviors, as in the de-
valuation tests which are now illustrated.
Let us now focus on the test with sham rats (Fig. 2,
second and third block). During the two test phases,
in which the rat perceives both the lever and the
chain, the satiety of respectively food A or B are kept
at its maximum level, namely five (the other satiety
level is kept at zero). Recall that the tests are per-
formed ‘in extinction’, that is without food delivery
(see sfA). The satiety for a food causes a strong in-
hibition to the Amg’s hedonic representation of such
food. As a consequence both the direct consumption
of that food and the perception of the conditioned
stimulus previously associated with it cannot elicit
the related Amg’s hedonic reaction. This is shown
by the lack of activation of the Amg’s Food-A neuron
(amgfA) during the second test phase when the rat
is satiated with food A.
The perception of both the lever and the chain dur-
ing the tests leads DLS to ‘vote’ for both the lever
press and chain pull actions at the same time (com-
pare the dlslev activation in the two test phases).
This rules out the influences of the S-R instrumen-
tal pathway on action selection: rigid habits are not
capable of driving the rat to make the suitable deci-
sion as they lack information on internal states (in-
cidentally, note that this experimental condition was
precisely designed by Balleine et al. (2003) to stop
the effects of habits that would otherwise ‘mask’
the motivation-sensitive Pavlovian influence on ac-
tion selection). On the other hand, satiation stops
only one of the two influences of the Amg-NAc path-
way on action selection in that it inhibits only the
amygdala representation of the conditioned stimulus
which has been satiated (compare the naclev acti-
vation in the two test phases). The fact that the
Amg-NAc pathway ‘votes’ only for the action associ-
ated with the non-satiated food breaks the symmetry
and makes the related action to win the competition
in PM with a high chance (compare the pmlev and
mlev activations in the two test phases).
The comparison between the lesioned and non-
lesioned conditions (Fig. 2, last two blocks) repro-
duces the basic finding of the target experiment of
Balleine et al. (2003) and confirms the aforemen-
tioned interpretation of the devaluation tests: as it
happens in real rats, a lesion to the BLA pathway
linking the amygdala to the NAc prevents the de-
valuation of food from having any effect on the ac-
tion selection process. More in particular (see Fig.
3), during the test non-lesioned (Sham) rats perform
the action associated with the non-devaluated food A
11.2 times on average whereas they perform the ac-
tion associated with the devaluated food A 2.9 times
on average: the difference between the two condi-
tions is statistically significant (paired t-test, t =
15.7003, df = 19, p < 0.001). On the contrary, BLA-
lesioned rats select actions randomly as indicated by
the fact that the number of performed actions asso-
ciated with the non-devaluated and the devaluated
food A have an average of 6.2 and 6.5: the difference
between the two conditions is not statistically signif-
icant (paired t-test, t = −0.4346, df = 19, p > 0.05).
These results show the plausibility of the hypothesis
for which the Amg-(BLA)-NAc pathway bridges the
Pavlovian processes happening in the amygdala with
the instrumental processes happening in the cortex-
basal ganglia pathway, so allowing the current state
of animals’ motivational system to modulate on the
fly their action selection mechanisms.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper presented an embodied model of some
important relations existing between Pavlovian and
instrumental conditioning. The model’s architecture
and functioning was constrained with relevant neuro-
scientific knowledge on the brain anatomy and phys-
iology. The model was validated by successfully re-
producing the primary outcomes of some instrumen-
tal conditioning devaluation tests conducted with
normal and amygdala-lesioned rats. These tests are
particularly important for studying the Pavlovian-
instrumental interplay as they show how the sensi-
tivity to motivational states exhibited by the Pavlo-
vian system can transfer to instrumentally acquired
behaviors.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the model
represents the first attempt to propose a compre-
hensive interpretation of the aforementioned phe-
nomena, tested in an embodied model. The works
most closely related to this one are those of Armony
et al. (1997), Dayan and Balleine (2002), More´n
and Balkenius (2000), and O’Reilly et al. (2007).
The model presented here differs from these works
in that it proposes an embodied model (absent in
all mentioned researches), presents a fully developed
model (Dayan and Balleine, 2002, presented only a
‘sketched’ model), and tackles the issue of the re-
lations existing between Pavlovian and instrumental
conditioning (Armony et al., 1997, More´n and Balke-
nius, 2000, and O’Reilly et al., 2007, focussed only
on Pavlovian conditioning).
Notwithstanding the proposed model has these
several strengths, it will be improved along many di-
rections in future work. The first limit of the work is
that the model was tested with an embodied system
where input signals were heavily pre-processed before
being fed into the model in the form of ‘localistic rep-
resentations’ (one neuron-one object), and where ac-
tions could be specified at a rather abstract level by
relying on hardwired low-level behavioral routines.
In the future the whole model, or some of its parts
(e.g. the amygdala component), will be tested with
more challenging embodied systems where the model
will be fed with realistic distributed input patterns
(e.g., the activations of retina’s pixels) and will be
required to issue low-level motor commands (e.g.,
the desired displacement and turning speed). Sec-
ond, the model has several limitations with respect
to available biological evidence. For example, it does
not learn to inhibit the dopamine signal at the onset
of the USs if these are preceded by CSs, as it happens
in real organisms (Schultz, 2002). This prevents the
model from performing ‘extinction’ (i.e., to un-learn
a classical conditioning association or an instrumen-
tal response if these are not followed anymore by a re-
ward) and from stopping the weights’ update. In fu-
ture work, the model will be added this capability by
drawing ideas from other works, for example O’Reilly
et al. (2007). Moreover, the model cannot reproduce
classical-conditioning based modulation of the vigor
with which instrumental actions are performed (Niv
et al., 2007), nor it is capable of triggering innate ac-
tions on the basis of classical-conditioning (e.g. ap-
proaching an US, or approaching a CS after this has
been associated to an US; Dayan and Balleine, 2002).
Finally, the model assumes that the selection of ac-
tions takes place within premotor cortex. However,
there is strong evidence (Redgrave et al., 1999) that
in real brains action selection takes place at the level
of the DLS itself, and so PM activations might only
reflect such selection without causing it (cf. Cisek,
2007). This possibility, however, opens up the prob-
lem of how the NAc might influence such action se-
lection, as requested for the Pavlovian processes to
exert an influence on instrumental processes. In this
respect, an interesting neural pathway through which
this influence might be implemented are the striato-
nigro-striatal connections (or ‘dopaminergic spirals’;
Haber et al., 2000). These topics will be addressed
in future work.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the proposed
model represents an important step in the construc-
tion of an integrated picture on how animals’ moti-
vational systems can both drive instrumental learn-
ing and directly regulate behavior. Constructing
such a picture is of paramount importance from the
scientific point of view as psychology and neuro-
science have now amassed a large body of evidence
and knowledge on the phenomena investigated here
which would greatly benefit of theoretical systemati-
zation. In this respect, we believe that computation
modeling carried out under the principles of compu-
tational embodied neuroscience illustrated in Sect. 2
can greatly aid this process.
As mentioned in Sect. 1, although this papers has
mainly a scientific relevance, the research agenda
of the work presented here has also a potential in-
terest for overcoming the limited autonomy of cur-
rent robots. In fact, a way to tackle these limits
is to attempt to understand the mechanisms under-
lying organisms’ behavioural flexibility so as to use
them in designing robot’s controllers. In this re-
spect, notwithstanding the motivational and emo-
tional regulation of behavior is very important for
behavioural flexibility, it has been almost completely
overlooked by autonomous robotics. For this reason
Parisi (2004) has advocated the need of an ‘Internal
Robotics’ research agenda dedicated to the study of
these processes. In line with this, recently machine
learning and robotics communities have been devot-
ing increasing efforts to the study of autonomous
learning by trying to improve the standard reinforce-
ment learning algorithms mentioned in Sect. 1 on the
basis of ideas coming from the study of real organ-
isms (Zlatev and Balkenius, 2001; Weng et al., 2001).
In this respect, the investigations on emotional reg-
ulation of learning and behaviour in animals, such
as those reported here, are expected to produce im-
portant insights on possible new principles and tech-
niques to be used to design more powerful learning
algorithms exhibiting a degree of autonomy similar
to that of real organisms (see Barto et al., 2004, and
Schembri et al., 2007, for two examples of this).
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